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Pursuit to Valenciennes 1918
The Fate of Soldiers at the Point of Capture
B R I A N PA S C A S
Abstract : This article tracks the Canadian Corps’ pursuit of the retreating
German army in the last weeks of the First World War. As French
hamlets, villages and towns were liberated, the war-weary troops—
nursing grudges after almost four years of war—encountered civilians
who had endured poor and sometimes brutal treatment under the yoke of
the cruel invader. During the Battle of Valenciennes hundreds of German
soldiers were killed; the vast majority perished under immense artillery
barrages. But a number who survived the onslaught of shells and bullets
succumbed to Canadians’ rifles while or after surrendering. Motives are
identified that drove frontline soldiers to kill surrendering opponents on
the battlefield. This article contends that one strong motive for killing
surrendering soldiers in the heat of battle was revenge for the untold
civilian suffering in previously enemy-occupied territory.

A

engaged in back-to-back coalition victories from
July to November 1918. On 18 July 1918, during the Second
Battle of the Marne, four French armies launched a successful
counterstroke to the German offensive of 15 July. By nightfall the
Allies had completely outmanoeuvered the German armies and driven
them back over 4 miles (7 km).1 General Erich Ludendorff’s fifth and
last major 1918 operation Marneschutz-Reims, or Friedenssturm
(Peace Offensive), was a total failure. In his 24 July memorandum,
Generalissimo Ferdinand Foch wrote, “The moment has come
to abandon the general defensive attitude … and to pass to the
llied armies

David Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives: A case study in the operation level of
war (New York: Routledge, 2009), 259-68; and Michael Neiberg, The Second Battle
of the Marne (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008), 120-28.

1  
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offensive.”2 The Allies seized the strategic initiative. The tenacious
German armies would continue the fight, now on the defensive, along
the fluctuating front during a relentless forced withdrawal. Although
the tide of war had turned, there remained the final Allied pursuit of
the retreating German armies on the Western Front.
Throughout the Hundred Days campaign (8 August–11 November
1918) fortified German defences were ruptured as the Allies engaged
in semi-mobile warfare, employing all-arms assault tactics supported
by an effective logistics infrastructure. The German army on the
Western Front was overwhelmed and defeated in the field.3
During the Canadian Corps’ final set-piece attack in Valenciennes
on 1-2 November hundreds of German soldiers succumbed to the
immense artillery and machine gun barrages and close-quarters
fighting.4 However, some were slain after having discarded their
weapons even though killing prisoners was morally wrong and was
forbidden according to the 1907 Hague Convention, Article 23 (c),
Section II Hostilities.5
This article examines the killing of potential prisoners at the
point of capture based on the ordeals and experiences of battlehardened Canadian soldiers. It traces the Canadian Corps’ pursuit of
the German army east of Cambrai to Valenciennes in the war’s last
two months. The frontline soldier had accrued scores to settle, after
suffering the loss of comrades and surviving treacherous acts during
trench warfare. As well, the Canadian soldier had heard stories and
rumours about fellow soldiers’ mistreatment and murder. Prisoner
killing was not only due to this revenge and retaliation, but was
also a consequence of indiscipline, fear or military expediency during
combat.6 This article contends that, in addition to these motives,
2  
Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch, trans. Bentley Mott (London:
William Heinemann, 1931), 427.
3  
For a Canadian perspective see Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire:
The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War (St. Catharines, ON:
Vanwell Publishing, 2004); and J.L. Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s
One Hundred Days, 1918 (Don Mills, ON: Oxford University Press, 2014).
4  
War Diary [WD], 10th Infantry Brigade, November 1918, Appendix C, RG9
III-D-3, Volume 4903, File 312, Library and Archives Canada [LAC].
5  
James B. Scott ed., The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 and 1907
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1915), 116.
6  
There were also psychological triggers leading to prisoner killings such as the
dehumanisation of the enemy. This topic is covered elsewhere. See Paul Hodges, “The
British Infantry and Atrocities on the Western Front, 1914-1918” (PhD Dissertation,
Birkbeck College, University of London, 2006), 200-10.
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The first German prisoner crossing the Canal de l’Escaut, Valenciennes. November, 1918.
[Library and Archives Canada item ID no. 3403211]

the Canadians exacted revenge on surrendering German soldiers
at Valenciennes after witnessing the wretched state of residents
and refugees found in the newly Canadian-liberated territory of
northeastern France.

leadership and discipline
Culpable soldiers defied the established rules of war when they killed
prisoners and potential prisoners: an “overt act of indiscipline.”7 This
unlawful killing sometimes occurred due to war weariness (a sense
of fatalism, a fed-up attitude in emotionally exhausted soldiers)8
or the breakdown in military authority leading to an escalation

Jordan Chase, “Unwilling to Continue, Ordered to Advance” (MA Thesis,
University of Calgary, 2013), 99.
8  
Chase, “Unwilling to Continue, Ordered to Advance,” 139.
7  
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in indiscipline.9 Jack Granatstein asserts a collapse of discipline
occurred at all levels of the Canadian Corps.10
Undoubtedly “disobedience and leadership are profoundly and
intimately linked.”11 The quality of leadership influenced the lower
ranks’ decision to wholeheartedly follow orders. In fact, weakness in
leadership caused erosion in discipline, which led to punishment.12
Disciplinary problems arose when soldiers were led by inexperienced,
unproven or over-zealous officers who had little regard for the rankand-files’ wellbeing. Leaders who inspired confidence and afforded the
men respect and dignity were, in turn, trusted and respected. Their
impartial disciplinary actions encouraged obedience and paternalistic
officers took an active role in their subordinates’ welfare. Lieutenant
(Lieut.) Herbert Hammond, while serving briefly with the 47th
Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) observed that the
unit’s commander lacked paternalism and “man-management skills,”
which unfortunately gave rise to indiscipline.13 Officers and men were
two separate and exclusive groups in the military hierarchy. A gulf
existed between these groups no matter how sincerely the officer
acted as a surrogate father to his subordinates.14 Indeed, there was
an immense gulf between these groups throughout the British army.15
Insubordination and indiscipline were manifestations of
war weariness, which was widespread in the Hundred Days.
Insubordination—a confrontation with a superior—could mean
9  
Jordan Chase, “’For Weariness Cannot but Fill our Men after so long a Period of
Hardship and Endurance:’ War Weariness in the Canadian Corps in the First World
War” (PhD Dissertation, University of Western Ontario, 2019), 303.
10  
Granatstein, The Greatest Victory, 153. He does not specify what were senior
officers’ disciplinary infractions.
11  
Craig Leslie Mantle, “Loyal Mutineers: An Examination of the Connection between
Leadership and Disobedience in the Canadian Army since 1885,” in The Unwilling
and the Reluctant: Theoretical Perspectives on Disobedience in the Military, ed.
Craig L. Mantle (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 69.
12  
David Campbell, “Military Discipline, Punishment, and Leadership in the First
World War: The Case of the 2nd Canadian Division,” in The Apathetic and the
Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1812 to 1919, ed. Craig
L. Mantle (Kingston and Toronto: Canadian Defence Agency Press and the Dundurn
Group, 2007), 302.
13  
Gary Sheffield, “Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British
Army, 1902-22” (PhD Dissertation, King’s College London, 1994), 325.
14  
Isabella Losinger, “Officer-Man Relations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force,
1914-1919” (MA Thesis, Carleton University, 1990), 63, 262.
15  
J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion
Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 53.
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rebuffed orders, refusal to parade and back talk. Minor acts of
military indiscipline included shirked duty, absence, theft, looting,
drunkenness and resisting arrest. In July 1918, Canadian Corps
Commander Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie wrote that sixtyone of the 374 General Field Courts Martial held for 1st Canadian
Division soldiers that year were for looting, house-breaking, being out
of bounds and hampering military police.16
In Quiévrechain, a French border town, a stretcher bearer learned
of nine murdered civilians. He hunted down trapped Germans and,
unrestrained, executed them as they surrendered. Caught in a no
man’s land between legal and illegal acts of war, he blurred the
distinction between killing and murder. He felt vindicated because
“he wasn’t killing prisoners, he was killing Germans.”17 The junior
officers and NCOs, if they witnessed or were informed of this, did
not intervene. These officers, at the end of the chain of command,
demonstrated a failure of leadership for not overseeing their men’s
daily discipline and averting unsanctioned behaviour. So too had
the unit commander, accountable for maintaining discipline, for not
enforcing proper military conduct and immediately remedying any
breaches of strict military discipline.

treachery and atrocities during trench warfare
Historians have studied extensively the fate of those surrendering
in the First World War and other major wars, describing various
circumstances that furnished soldiers’ rationale for prisoner killing.
Both hot-blooded (spontaneously committed mainly at the moment of
capitulation) and cold-blooded (callously carried out after surrender
primarily out of the combat zone) prisoner killings occurring during

16  
Craig Gibson, Behind the Front: British Soldiers and French Civilians, 1914-1918
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 363.
17  
“The Last Push,” Chapter 15, Disc 3, Flanders’ Fields: Canadian Voices From
WW1, directed by J. Frank Willis (CBC Audio, 2006), DVD.
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and after battle have been analysed.18 One assessment of British
soldiers’ writings discloses that seventy of the eighty-two random
incidents of prisoner-killing researched were hot-blooded killings,
sixty-seven of which were at the point of capture.19
Quarter (exemption from death) could be denied while fighting
without restraint in the cauldron of war. During close-range combat a
soldier had no more than a fifty-fifty chance of being granted quarter.20
When commenting on prisoner killing Desmond Morton explained,
“once soldiers have screwed up their emotions to kill, it is easier to
continue than to stop. It is a time of acute mental disability.”21 A
soldier’s life was in jeopardy when attempting to surrender, the most
dangerous risk in combat. In the savagery of face-to-face combat,
the killing impulse was not easily anesthetised. Violence could not
necessarily be sundered from capture.
Military recruits were indoctrinated into an “extremely violent
battlefield culture.”22 The combatant’s predisposition (temperament,
conditioning techniques of training and recent battlefield experience)
was a crucial factor when deciding to grant mercy.23 According to
veteran Stephen Graham, “[t]he real driving power [to do what was
required] lay in brutal thought and word and act.”24 A number of these
sanctioned killers became indifferent to taking a life regardless of the
situation. These seasoned fighters—trained to kill, paid to kill—could

Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1998),
367-94; Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in
Twentieth-Century Warfare (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Tim Cook, “The
Politics of Surrender: Canadian Soldiers and the Killing of Prisoners in the Great
War,” The Journal of Military History, 70, 3 (July, 2006); How Fighting Ends: A
History of Surrender, ed. Holger Afflerbach and Hew Strachan (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2012; reprint 2014); and Dale Blair, No Quarter: Unlawful Killing
and Surrender in the Australian War Experience 1915-18 (Port Adelaide, Australia:
Ginninderra Press, 2015).
19  
Hodges, “The British Infantry and Atrocities on the Western Front, 19141918,” 120.
20  
Richard Holmes, Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (London: Cassell
Military, 2004), 382. Holmes does not cite any evidence for this statistic.
21  
Randy Boswell, “When surrender was met with a bayonet blade,” The Ottawa
Citizen, 22 September 2006, A3.
22  
Niall Ferguson, “Prisoner Taking and Prisoner Killing in the Age of Total War,”
War in History 11, 2 (April 2004): 149.
23  
Dave Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War
and Society (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009), 189.
24  
Stephen Graham, A Private in the Guards (London: Macmillan and Co.,
1919), 213.
18  
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be merciless to a defeated enemy no longer with any means of defence.
On 8 May 1915 during the German assault in the Ypres Salient,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry trenches at Bellewaerde
Ridge had been mostly obliterated. Private (Pte.) Frederick Cox
raised his hands in surrender as ordered by his German captor, who
then deliberately put his rifle muzzle against Cox’s palm and fired.
Cox died of blood poisoning two week later while in captivity.25 While
waiting to attack the German front line at Givenchy on 15 June
1915, Pte. George Bell, 1st Battalion proclaimed, “We are no longer
human. Kill! Kill!! Kill!!! that is our only instinct. With bayonet,
bomb, trench knife and even with bare hands we kill.”26
Some assailants under severe stress, adrenaline pumping and “half
mad with excitement,”27 committed prisoner killings at the moment
of capture. The cornered enemy was killed out of hand, particularly
if there was any resistance or hesitancy. Imagine the confusion on a
chaotic battleground: some defenders immediately thrust their hands
up in voluntary capitulation, while nearby others fought doggedly to
the end. Veteran Victor Wheeler observed that in the white heat of
battle “action is the soldier’s instinctive reflex. There is … no time
for weighing Justice in the scales of Humanity. There is only time for
action, be it good or evil.”28 Veteran Ernst Jünger declared a soldier’s
blood was up after overrunning a well-defended trench; his killing
impulse forbade the taking of prisoners.29
On the opening day of the Battle of Amiens a Royal Artillery
officer discovered a trench full of dead Germans; Canadians had
bayoneted them. He explained that it was not feasible to apprehend
prisoners in a frontline trench.30 They could not spare the manpower
to secure prisoners during an attack. Although some German
captives were killed throughout the conflict, this offence was not
committed indiscriminately as some historians claim. Indeed, the
George Pearson, The Escape of a Princess Pat (Toronto: McClelland, Goodchild
& Stewart, 1918), 42-3.
26  
George V. Bell, Back to Blighty, MG30 E113, File 1, 47, LAC.
27  
Guy Chapman, A Passionate Prodigality (New York: Fawcett World Library,
1967), 80.
28  
Victor Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land (Edmonton: Alberta
Historical Resources Foundation, 1980), 337.
29  
Ernst Jünger, The Storm of Steel (New York: Zimmermann & Zimmermann,
1985), 263-63.
30  
Gordon Brook-Shepherd, November 1918: The Last Act of the Great War (London:
Collins, 1981), 60.
25  
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lack of corroborating evidence (often inconclusive) taints prisonerkilling stories with an apocryphal quality. Evidently, “such behaviour
was episodic, not routine; opportunist, not systematic.”31 Stories
could be misinterpreted. While serving in the trenches in the Ypres
Salient in May 1916, Pte. Sidney Hampson recounted that 10th
Battalion soldiers erected a large sign notifying the Germans that
the Canadians did not take any prisoners. This dire warning was no
doubt meant to halt trench raiding in the sector where the opposing
trenches were only forty yards apart.32 21st Battalion Sergeant (Sgt.)
William Doolan declared he never witnessed any prisoner atrocities
although he heard about them. Doolan claimed that, in his outfit,
they never went out of their way to be kind or cruel to prisoners.33
Emotion-based motives for prisoner killing were grief with its
attendant anger, empowerment and, the most intense, revenge, which
transformed into rage.34 From the war’s onset, German atrocities
(the killing of a non-combatant) had infuriated Allied soldiers. Upon
learning about the 7 May 1915 sinking of the Lusitania, George
Ormsby serving in the 15th Battalion felt that few prisoners would
be taken. He vowed retaliation stating that he joined the machine
gun section to “mow down the brutes.”35 During the Battle of
Passchendaele, Canadian stretcher parties were annihilated on the
Gravenstafel road while evacuating wounded. According to 42nd
Battalion soldiers, “It was then we swore that Fritz would, some
day, pay, and pay dearly for his treachery. They would then learn
what Canadian revenge meant.”36 Accrued grievances sparked quick
bayonet work in September 1916 at Courcelette, where prisoner
killings flourished as recorded by 2nd Canadian Division commander

Alan Kramer, “Surrender of Soldiers in World War I,” in How Fighting Ends, 277;
and Alan Kramer, Dynamic of Destruction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First
World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 64.
32  
Sidney Hampson, May 12, 1916 letter, Canadian Letters and Images Project
(CLIP), accessed April 9, 2022, https://www.canadianletters.ca/.
33  
W.P. Doolan, CBC Flanders’ Fields, RG41 B-III-1, Volume 10, LAC.
34  
Hodges, “The British Infantry and Atrocities on the Western Front, 1914-1918,”
190; and Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, 171.
35  
Martha Hanna, Anxious Days and Tearful Nights: Canadian War Wives during
the Great War (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2020), 36;
and Tim Cook, “’My Whole Heart and Soul is in this War’: The Letters and War
Service of Sergeant G.L. Ormsby,” Canadian Military History, 15, 1 (2006): 54.
36  
William Breckenridge, From Vimy Ridge to Mons: A Historical Narrative (selfpublished, 1919), 99.
31  
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Major-General (Maj.-Gen.) Richard Turner.37 On 18 November that
year, the 4th Canadian Division attacked Desire Trench taking 625
prisoners, after which German Sergeant Walter accused a Canadian
officer of killing a captured German officer and an infantryman from
the 120th Reserve Infantry.38 Undeniably this vengeance at the sharp
end was pervasive in the trenches.39
Lyn Macdonald implies that an order issued from British
General Headquarters (GHQ) days before the Battle of the Somme
directed British soldiers to give no quarter and take no prisoners. She
claims the Prisoner of War (POW) cages were sparsely populated
in the first ten weeks of the battle. The unequivocal order’s third
paragraph stated:
It is the duty of all ranks to continue to use their weapons against the
enemy’s fighting troops, unless and until it is beyond all doubt that
those have not only ceased all resistance but that, whether through
having voluntarily thrown down their weapons or otherwise, they have
definitely and finally abandoned all hope and intention of resisting
further. In the case of apparent surrender, it lies with the enemy to
prove his intention beyond the possibility of misunderstanding, before
the surrender can be accepted as genuine.40

Macdonald’s view concerning what troops believed this order meant
has since been challenged pointing out that, although ambiguous,
there was no intended encouragement to give no quarter. GHQ
would have been mindful of Article 23 (d) of the Hague Convention—
reprinted in the Field Service Pocket Book (1914), which was issued
to British army officers—stating it was forbidden to declare no
quarter will be given.41
In May 1917, Kaiser Wilhelm II instructed troops in Belgium to
take no British prisoners. Seventeen years earlier when addressing his

William Stewart, The Canadians on the Somme, 1916: The Neglected Campaign
(Solihull, England: Helion & Company, 2017), 128.
38  
August Gallinger, The Countercharge: The Matter of War-criminals from the
German Side, (Munich: Sueddeutsche Monatshefte, 1922), 48.
39  
Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System
(London: Pan Books, 2000), 207-08.
40  
Lyn Macdonald, Somme (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 288-89.
41  
Field Service Pocket Book (London: HMSO, 1914; reprint, Devon, UK: David &
Charles, 1971), 230.
37  
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troops who were leaving to suppress the Boxer Rebellion, the Kaiser
had ordered: “No quarter will be given! Prisoners will not be taken!”42
Occasionally the jingoistic press in newspapers, inundated with
propaganda, circulated tales of German atrocities. Possibly the most
famous was that of a crucified Canadian soldier in the Ypres Salient
in 1915. This powerful myth was finally proven false after the war.43
Some, but not all soldiers were sceptical of such stories. In March 1917
the Canadian Press Association choose the Toronto Globe’s Stewart
Lyon as its first official European press correspondent. Lyon, known
for his patriotism, emphasised “Hun barbarism.”44 An undocumented
atrocity account appeared after the Battle of Hill 70 in August 1917.
A Toronto newspaper on 10 November named ten men from the 87th
Battalion whose bodies, it was reported, were discovered with their
throats cut, after they had been captured and killed at Lens. In fact,
five of them were reported missing on 14 August after the Germans
had heavily shelled the forward and rear areas of the 87th Battalion’s
sector west of Lens. The other five were reported missing on 15
August, after the 87th mounted offensive patrols on the southwestern
outskirts of Lens. Three of the missing, one a prisoner with a fatal
gun shot wound, died and were buried. The other seven—whose
bodies were never found—are commemorated on the ramparts of the
Vimy Memorial.45

Jonathan Boff, Haig’s Enemy: Crown Prince Rupprecht and Germany’s War on
the Western Front (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 267; and John LewisStempel, The War Behind the Wire: The Life, Death and Glory of British Prisoners
of War 1914-18 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014), 308.
43  
However, in 2002 Iain Overton discovered a letter from a British army nurse who
named Sergeant Harry Band as the victim. Band, serving in the 15th Battalion,
went missing in action on 24 April 1915. See Nathan Greenfield, Baptism of Fire:
The Second Battle of Ypres and the Forging of Canada, April 1915 (Toronto:
HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 190.
44  
Jeff Keshen, “All the News That Was Fit to Print: Ernest J. Chambers and
Information Control in Canada, 1914-19,” Canadian Historical Review 73, 3
(1992): 324.
45  
Jonathan Vance, A Township at War (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University
Press, 2018), 175; WD, 11th Infantry Brigade, August 1917, RG9 III-D3, Volume
4904, File 316, LAC; and Canadian Great War Project, Newspaper Extract for
Private Stephen Duckhouse.
42  
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The Germans frequently attempted ruses de guerre.46 At
Passchendaele, a party of Germans with bandaged heads—feigning
wounds—had gestured to Canadian troops for assistance, but then
opened fire.47 The Australian official historian, Charles Bean recorded
an incident near Passchendaele in September 1917: as a group of
Germans was surrendering, one of them killed an Australian soldier.
For this “vilest treachery” all the prisoners were bayonetted. Bean
endorsed this lethal reprisal because “such incidents are inevitable
in the heat of battle.”48 On 30 March 1918, as part of the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade’s assault on Moreuil Wood near Amiens, William
Ferguson of the Royal Canadian Dragoons recounted, “I know
when we were going through Moreuil Wood there was [sic] German
prisoners laying [sic] there dead. We just shot them in the back
anyway because we had some of our fellows bumped off, you know;
they’d possum and they kicked off a couple of our fellows.”49 Fear,
palpable on the front line, had motivated some Canadians to act
impulsively in committing hot-blooded killings when anticipating
treacherous acts during surrender.50 Fear drove others to perpetrate
cold-blooded executions when outnumbered by prisoners who might
overpower them during escort to POW cages.

Deadly acts of subterfuge were repeated in the Second World War when German
soldiers pretending to surrender, threw grenades or ambushed and gunned-down
Canadian soldiers whose comrades then sought revenge. Canadian soldiers carried
out reprisal killings after learning Canadian prisoners had been executed by 12th
SS Panzer Division soldiers. See Tim Cook, Fight to the Finish: Canadians in the
Second World War 1944-1945 (Toronto: Allen Lane, 2015), 159.
47  
WD, 49th Battalion, November 1917, Appendix A, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4940,
File 440, LAC.
48  
C.E.W. Bean, The Australian Imperial Force in France 1917, Vol. 4, 13th Edition
(Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1943), 772.
49  
“The German Drive,” Chapter 13, Disc 3, Flanders’ Fields: Canadian Voices
From WW1, directed by J. Frank Willis (CBC Audio, 2006), DVD.
50  
During the South African War, Canadian mounted infantry in the Strathcona’s
Horse allegedly hanged Boers who shot at British soldiers who had gone forward to
take their surrender. They were reprimanded. See Chris Madsen, “Between Law and
Inhumanity: Canadian Troops and British Responses to Guerrilla Warfare in the
South African War,” in Inventing Collateral Damage: Civilian Casualties, War, and
Empire, ed. Stephen Rockel and Rick Halpern (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009),
152.
46  
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the pursuit
The craving for retaliation fostered throughout static trench warfare
was further inflamed during the period of manoeuvre and set-piece
attacks during the Hundred Days. For the first time in the war,
Canadian soldiers liberated civilian-inhabited cities, towns and
villages that had spent years under oppressive German occupation.
Already bitter over killed and maimed pals, some callous battletempered warriors were eager to settle accounts, hoping to add more
names to German Rolls of Honour. They would seek further payback
as they tracked the fleeing enemy eastward, prepared to avenge noncombatant victims of war.
Frontline soldiers developed coping strategies to endure the chaos
and brutality of war. Some adopted a stoic attitude, took a fatalistic
approach to war, or relied on alcohol. Others adhered to a simple
faith or religion, had strong family ties or maintained a sense of
humour.51 These schemes were indispensable when dealing with the
death or mutilation of a comrade or devoted officer to whom they
felt a fierce sense of accountability. The coping mechanisms were
similarly employed when grappling with reactions to the civilians’
shocking stories of oppression, starvation, shelling and atrocities.
In September 1918, after capturing Récourt (northwest of
Marquion), the 50th Battalion discovered forty emaciated French
women, sealed in a cave, who had been forced to do manual labour
and perform degrading acts. One young woman, injured by shell fire,
had not received any medical assistance. This appalling scene left a
“never-healing scar on many a young soldier’s memory!”52
At the start of the advance (12 to 17 October), the 1st Canadian
Division’s Field Artillery batteries fired daily test barrages over the
Canal de la Sensée while the troops engaged in aggressive patrols and
raids in mopping-up operations.53 These activities aided in determining
their opponents’ strength and initial moment of disengagement.

For a discussion on British and German coping strategies, see Alexander Watson,
Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British
Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 85-107,
Appendix 1.
52  
Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 339-40.
53  
G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of
Canadian Artillery Volume 1 1534-1919 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967),
363-64; and Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Army, 118.
51  
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There was no “tit-for-tat” shelling on 17 October, as the Germans
had commenced a large-scale withdrawal to the Hermann Line where
they entrenched at the Canal de l’Escaut.54 The Canadians pursued
the enemy until the evening of 23 October where the corps front
stabilised along the canal—a 18,000-yard (16.5 km) water-barrier
front extending from Trith-St. Léger on the western tow-path of the
canal (4th Canadian Division sector) north to Condé (3rd Canadian
Division sector).55
There would be no slacking in the chase to the canal. Armoured
cars, Canadian Light Horse cavalry squadrons, machine gun
batteries, 6-inch trench mortar units and cyclist companies were
attached to the infantry formations as pursuit troops. During the
daily tracking, they were to keep in touch with the enemy, harassing
and accelerating their retirement.56 From mid-October onwards
pockets of stiff resistance hindered the Canadian Corps’ advance.
The Germans’ fall-back tactics included abandoning held positions
during the night and entrenching themselves in positions difficult to
shell, with stiffened opposition from machine gun posts and snipers
before extracting themselves again.57
The Canadians encountered premeditated devastation comparable
to the scorched earth policy enacted during the German withdrawal
to the Hindenburg Line in March 1917. At that time Ernst Jünger
believed, “War means the destruction of the enemy without scruple
and by any means.”58 This systematic wanton havoc slowed the
Canadians’ progress. They faced a wasteland of cratered crossroads,
mined railway crossings and bridge abutments, chopped telegraph
poles, wrecked bridges, smashed mining machinery, poisoned wells
and manipulated canal water levels. At one road crossing a timefused detonator had blown a minenwerfer bomb buried four feet

Arthur Bick, The Diary of an Artillery Officer: The 1st Canadian Divisional
Artillery on the Western Front, ed. Peter Bick (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011),
172-73.
55  
Andrew McNaughton, “The Capture of Valenciennes: A Study in Co-ordination,”
Canadian Defence Quarterly 10, 3 (April 1933): 279.
56  
Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918 (Ottawa:
Department of Militia and Defence, 1918), 73; and Ted Glenn, Riding Into Battle:
Canadian Cyclists in the Great War (Toronto: Dundurn, 2018), 107-17.
57  
Narrative of Operations of the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG9 III-D-2,
Volume 4797, File 84, LAC.
58  
Jünger, The Storm of Steel, 126-27.
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below the pave stones, producing four craters.59 The entire DouaiValenciennes Railway was dynamited.60 Frustrating holdups occurred
when, for instance, mammoth amounts of manure from German horse
transport had to be removed from roadways.61 Canadian engineers
were tasked with overhauling a logistical infrastructure wrecked by
shell and sabotage.62
The German military implemented various types of booby-traps,
the arming of which was a risky business—the remains of Germans
who had been preparing a booby-trap were found in a gallery under a
road.63 Silent long-delay-action fuses (glass tubes filled with corrosive
liquid, which ate away a wire), were embedded in high explosive (HE)
shells. These were primed for one, two, twenty-four or seventy-two
hours; set to destroy guns, battery positions, dug-outs, depots and
abandoned ammunition dumps. Improvised explosive devices were
hidden in furnished dug-outs, coal dumps and behind doors. Primed
hand grenades beneath helmets awaited souvenir-hunting soldiers.
Mines fired electrically from a distance were hidden on bridges and
in billets. Delay-action mines, a few with 1,000-lb charges, exploded
under railway tracks, in railway centres and in abandoned villages.
Mines in Cambrai and Roisel were timed for sixteen days and
forty-seven days respectively.64 One such mine timed for thirty to
thirty-five days blew up in Caudry (east of Cambrai) inflicting many
casualties.65 Percussion booby-traps were found in the 46th Battalion
area: trench mortar shells buried in the ground with a board laid on
top of the fuse. Some German prisoners were rounded up to remove
these land mines.66 Other prisoners were compelled to sample water
from captured wells.
Currie, Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918, 73; and WD, 4th
Brigade, CE, October 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4992, File 647, LAC.
60  
Hugh Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish)
Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War 1914-1919 (Toronto: The MacMillan
Company, 1932), 319.
61  
WD, 3rd Canadian Divisional Train, October 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 5020,
File 769, LAC.
62  
Michael Ryan, “Supplying the Materiel Battle: Combined Logistics in the
Canadian Corps, 1915-1918” (MA Thesis, Carleton University, 2005), 128.
63  
WD, 3rd Canadian Tunnelling Company, October 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume
5003, File 686, LAC.
64  
Amendments to S.S. 163, RG9 III-C-5, Volume 4426, Folder 3, File 6, LAC.
65  
Blair Ripley, “Delayed Action Mines as Affecting the Railways on the British
Western Front,” Canadian Railway and Marine World, October (1919): 521-22.
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Owing to the continuous advance, time-consuming supply
transportation from distant railheads hindered the British
Expeditionary Force’s progress more than the Germans’ fighting
withdrawal.67 Nevertheless, the Canadian Corps’ average pace of
uninterrupted advance was 2.8 miles (4.5 km) per day throughout
the period 17 to 24 October as the front was pushed eastward.68 On
Saturday 19 October, the Canadians liberated some forty towns and
villages. By this time Lewarde, Somain, Abscon, Mastaing, Roeulx,
Escaudain, Hornaing and Denain were free.69 The people greeted the
Canadians with embraces and cheering. An old man hugged Kenneth
Foster, a twenty-one-year-old serving in the 2nd Battalion, in true
French style. Foster recalled, “first one side and then the other. It so
happened that said Frenchman was wearing an elegant beard, also,
he was chewing tobacco and the juice thereof flowed freely down his
facial adornment.”70 For the medical staff, the appearance of liberated
civilians signified a defining moment that victory was in sight.71
The weary Canadian infantry—with their pent-up hostilities and
grudges—were further enraged by the aftermath of German atrocities
in the towns and villages during their pursuit. The occupation
forces had “endangered civilian life through harsh restrictions, the
repression of non-compliant behaviour, the imposition of a massive
military presence … material exploitation, and the dismantling of
‘native’ institutions.”72 Nonetheless, most German soldiers billeted in
the French homes were civil lodgers. The organised authority, not the
individual soldier, had imposed its tyranny on the inhabitants.

Ian Brown, “Feeding Victory: The Logistic Imperative Behind the Hundred Days,”
in 1918: Defining Victory, ed. Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (Canberra, Australia:
Army Unit History, 1999), 146.
68  
Currie, Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918, 83.
69  
Report of the Ministry: Overseas Military Forces of Canada 1918 (London: His
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1919), 174.
70  
Kenneth W. Foster Memoir, CLIP, accessed April 9, 2022, https://www.
canadianletters.ca/.
71  
Heather Moran, “Stretcher Bearers and Surgeons: Canadian Front-Line Medicine
during the First World War, 1914-1918” (PhD Dissertation, University of Western
Ontario, 2008), 246.
72  
Sophie de Schaepdrijver, “Populations under occupation,” in The Cambridge
History of the First World War, Vol. III: Civil Society, ed. Jay Winter (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 243.
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Although brutalised by the war, rendering them somewhat
“impervious to the horror around them,”73 witnessing the senseless
suffering of local inhabitants weighed heavily on the liberators:
Wounded or killed civilians seemed to have a most depressing effect
on the troops. Men, on whom the sight of dead and wounded fellow
soldiers apparently had little or no effect, appeared quite shocked when
the victims were civilians. Violent death and wounds were somehow
dignified by a uniform but when they came to those in ordinary clothes
they seemed incompatible and almost horrible. The sight of a child
wounded or killed by shell fire would sink a whole battalion in the
depths of depression.74

Some comfortable billets were available in these reclaimed
communities. A few gardens were still stocked with vegetables.75
Horse carcasses lay strewn along the roadside in Lewarde; their rumps
had been cut out to feed German troops or French inhabitants.76 A
trainload of Lewarde furniture, which the Germans had looted, was
seized. The Germans had destroyed all the pumps and hydrants
in Abscon, leaving most residents without water. A few wells were
opened and tank lorries supplied water.77 Canadian Engineer officer
John Menzies wrote regarding another village where houses had been
ransacked and babies’ cradles had been “filthed.” Aware that “there
were civilians here, he [the enemy] shelled the village with gas. One
of the shells hit the house I am in now, and the two little kiddies,
pretty little girls, were deathly sick from the fumes.”78 The town
of Auberchicourt was absolutely deserted, the citizens forced out.
Germans had looted their homes, smashed furniture and wrecked the
coal mines. An artilleryman was killed when he struck a chord on a

Peter Farrugia, “Introduction,” in Portraits of Battle: Courage, Grief, and
Strength in Canada’s Great War, ed. Peter Farrugia and Evan Habkirk (Vancouver:
UBC Press, 2021), 5.
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Charles Henry Savage 1936 Memoir, CLIP, accessed April 9, 2022, https://www.
canadianletters.ca/.
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WD, 102nd Battalion, October 1918, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4945, File 456, LAC.
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Wilfred Kerr, Arms and the Maple Leaf: The Memoir of Wilfred Kerr, Canadian
Field Artillery, 1918 (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2005), 118.
77  
WD, 4th Brigade, CE, October 1918, LAC.
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Accounts From Canada’s Military History, ed. J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer
(Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2010), 204.
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piano wired with a hidden bomb. The disgraced enemy had earned a
”foul and dirty reputation.”79
Troops in Somain listened, “with much sentiment,” to the
civilians’ harrowing stories such as children compelled to gather up
and bury mutilated bodies.80 Many people there had lived in flooded
cellars for days until an influenza epidemic broke out.81 The 10th
Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB) headquarters ordered that the town
of Abscon’s 2,300 civilians be fed.82 The responsibility for feeding the
civilian population in addition to supplying fighting troops taxed the
resources of the mechanised and horse-transport systems. Veteran
Will Bird sympathised with the underfed, starving inhabits of the
freed villages. Without rations one day, he scrounged for food from
a nearby British outfit. The cook was serving hot mulligan stew to
some fifteen children, courtesy of the Tommies who had donated
their dinners. Bird never asked for a helping.83 Currie observed that
many Canadian units voluntarily donated 15 per cent of their rations
to the civilians.84
The retreating Germans continued to forage or pillage whatever
they could in the campaign zone. Their commandeering system
was absolute:
He has taken away with him everything. Not a horse nor a cow, a pig
nor a hen, is left in the country. In one village he has even taken the
nanny-goat whose milk was keeping alive a sick child. He burned the
straw he threshed. Where he could not remove grain he scattered it over
the barnyard.85

The 10th CIB’s 44th Battalion first came upon repatriated
inhabitants in Mastaing. Stoves, chairs and tables had been

L. McLeod Gould, From B.C. to Baisieux: Being the Narrative History of the
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Maclean Publishing, 1932), 165.
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Wilfred Laurier University, 2008), 126.
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smashed, mattresses ripped to shreds and every mirror shattered.
An axe-wielding German had demolished a piano. Open fireplaces
contained bombs. Horses stabled in living rooms left “all in filth
unspeakable.”86 The troops regarded the wanton destruction
as a crime against humanity. In Roeulx, the night before their
deliverance from bondage, a seventy-five-year-old woman was
executed for leaving a light on during the night.87
The 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles (CMR) battalion marched
to Rieulay. The troops realised the cruelties endured under the
heel of the detested enemy as the citizens informed them that the
Germans had requisitioned their animals and grain. The people had
received no portion for their arduous labour. Even young boys had
been forced to dig trenches. The slightest rule infraction had meant
imprisonment. The 4th CMRs were generous with their food in
Hornaing, donating bread, bully beef, biscuits and iron rations to the
people.88 In the mining village of Escaudain, the departing Germans
had dropped explosives in local mine shafts before pilfering cows and
hens.89 The 19th Battalion entered Neuville-sur-l’Escaut, where the
medical officer and staff encountered vermin-infested, blind, starving
and venereal-diseased souls.90 All ranks were notified that the enemy
had released infected prostitutes from venereal hospitals into the
Canadian Corps-inhabited area.91 Apparently 60,000 infected women
had been released from hospital.92
On 19 October, 44th and 47th Battalion troops entered Denain.
Some 25,000 residents and evacuees occupied the mining town, which

86  
Joseph Hayes, The Eighty-Fifth In France and Flanders (Halifax, NS: Royal Print
& Litho, 1920), 179.
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Corps in the First World War (Waterloo, ON: Wilfred Laurier University Press,
2017), 468.
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bordered the Canal de l’Escaut.93 Its steelworks, which had employed
4,000 men, were destroyed and the mines rigged for demolition.94
Coal mine buildings lay gutted and machinery had been hauled away
or smashed.95 Seven delay-action mines were found and removed. The
retreating Germans had pummelled the town with indiscriminate
shelling. There was no distinction between soldier and civilian; war
was waged against both. The freed citizens, numb after four years
of repression, recounted stories of cruel German military force and
overbearing regulations. Denain’s mayor M. Delphien had been
arrested in 1916 for instructing the people not to disclose their
copper.96 Women had toiled in sandbag factories under constant
threat of the lash. Sandbags destined for German trenches were also
produced in industrial towns such as Tourcoing, Roubaix and Lille by
people pressed into service.97 50th Battalion members were anxious
“to deal the Deutschlanders the coup de grâce.”98
On 30 October, the 44th Battalion drove the Germans further
north of Famars. Hundreds of residents were found in an unspeakable
state of misery, having been imprisoned in cellars for more than a
week with practically no food.99
The Canadians would soon discover that Valenciennes’
citizens, young and old, had also endured forced work, heavy fines,
imprisonment and deportation. Their resources had been siphoned

From the German Spring Offensive in March to August 1918, more than 200,000
people were evacuated from areas under threat of German incursion. See Peter
Gatrell and Philippe Nivet, “Refugees and exiles,” in The Cambridge History of the
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94  
Helen McPhail, The Long Silence: Civilian Life under the German Occupation of
Northern France, 1914-1918 (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 34, 216.
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the Nord, 1914-1918: Living with the enemy in First World War France (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 2018), 99-100.
97  
Edgar Russenholt, Six Thousand Canadian Men: Being the History of the 44th
Battalion Canadian Infantry 1914-1919 (Winnipeg: The Forty-fourth Battalion
Association, 1932), 205; and Annette Becker, “Life in an Occupied Zone: Lille,
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off, their factories emptied and the city’s renowned linen stolen.100
Even the German Red Cross workers who had entered Valenciennes
in September 1914 had been armed with rifles, sabres and revolvers.101

combat and capitulation
Five German divisions held the city of Valenciennes—an important
railway hub bordering the Canal de l’Escaut, with 5,000 citizens
and refugees. German defenders controlled the high ground 3,000
yards (2.7 km) to the south in the vicinity of Mont Houy, a wooded
knoll. A set-piece operation was proposed to capture the city. The
10th CIB would initially clear Mont Houy, then advance north
to the Valenciennes-Maubeuge railway on the southern border of
Valenciennes and lastly secure the industrialised suburb of Marly as
the brigade enveloped Valenciennes from the south.102 The 12th CIB
would establish bridgeheads over the canal.103 Currie pointed to Mont
Houy and exclaimed to Canadian Corps Heavy Artillery BrigadierGeneral (Brig.-Gen.) Andrew McNaughton: “The war must be nearly
over now and I do not want any more fighting or casualties that can
be helped.”104 (See Appendix: The Battle of Valenciennes Casualties)
The 4th Canadian Division (Maj.-Gen. David Watson), XXII
Corps and XVII Corps unleashed the attack at 5:15 a.m. on Friday,
1 November from the canal southeast to Sepmeries.105 The six Heavy
Artillery and eight Field Artillery brigades’ 296 guns and howitzers
erupted on the 2,500-yard (2.3 km) Canadian front from the canal

Georges Gromaire, L’Occupation Allemande en France (1914-1918), (Paris:
Payon, 1925). For an insight into those caught between the lines, see Tammy Proctor,
Civilians in a World at War, 1914-1918 (New York: University Press), 2010.
101  
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James Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Vol. V: 26th
September – 11th November The Advance to Victory (Nashville, Tennessee: The
Battery Press, 1993), 395; and 4th Canadian Division Report On Valenciennes
Operations October 27th to November 6th, RG9 III-D-2, Volume 4797, File 84, LAC.
103  
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File 9, LAC.
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Notes dictated by D.H.S. 18/12/25, RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1821, File GAQ-5-27,
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to the Rhonelle River.106 Without tank assistance, the understrength
44th Battalion attacked on the right bordering Famars beneath a
canopy of steel with two companies and a mopping-up party. Their
objectives were Mont Houy, La Briquette and Aulnoy. Although the
enemy shelled Mont Houy with mustard gas, by 6:30 a.m. it was
overrun. The Canadians and British secured Aulnoy by 7:00 a.m.
Near Aulnoy, the 44th captured and evacuated machine gun and
“Toc Emma” crews before they went into action. Gas jars primed for
gradual leakage were found in Aulnoy’s cellars where 1,400 people
106  
Andrew McNaughton, The Development of Artillery in the Great War, 12, RG24C-6-e, Volume 1821, File GAQ-5-27, LAC.
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were living. Many Feldgraue hiding in the houses were taken prisoner;
those who held out were killed.107
The 44th and 46th Battalions, short of experienced frontline
soldiers, recruited runners, batmen, orderly room staff, cooks and
bandsmen for mopping-up parties. Fearing for their own safety and
not wanting to take any chances these untrained squads may have
lacked the discipline to refrain from shooting when they encountered
uncooperative opponents.
The British Manual of Military Law (908 pages long) Chapter
XIV, paragraph 80 stated “A commander may not put his prisoners
to death because their presence retards his movements or diminishes
his means of resistance by necessitating a large guard, or by reason
of their consuming his supplies.”108 However, military expediency
trumped mercy when prisoners were viewed as an impediment to
the battle’s momentum. No time whatsoever could be lost during the
operation; the attackers had to keep pace behind the 205-minutelong Field Artillery creeping barrage’s predetermined rate of 100
yards every 4, then 5 minutes. A moral dilemma arose: the attacking
Canadians, in order to maintain the attack’s tempo, could give no
quarter to surrendering opponents. Otherwise, they could escort
prisoners back thus jeopardising their fighting efficiency, or await
an escort and risk losing the protection of the barrage and shrapnel
smoke screen.
In 1902, three years after the first Hague Convention, the German
General Staff issued Kriegsbauch im Landkriege. Prisoner killing
was sanctioned: “In the case of overwhelming necessity, when other
means of precaution do not exist and the existence of the prisoners
becomes a danger to one’s own existence.” Self-preservation justified
giving no quarter.109
Killing prisoners was sometimes viewed as a military necessity if
it meant, paradoxically, saving lives. For example, while attempting
to secure Regina Trench in the fall of 1916, Pte. Gilbert Caunt, 8th
Battalion recalled that prisoners were sent back to the Canadian line
107  
History of the 44th Battalion, CEF, Textual Records 58C 1 34.14, Canadian War
Museum; and 44th Battalion, Appendix 27, Report on Operations, RG9 III-D-2,
Volume 4797, File 84, LAC.
108  
Manual of Military Law (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 6th Edition,
1914; reprint 1917), 248.
109  
The War Book of the German General Staff, trans. John Morgan (New York:
McBride, Nast & Company, 1915), 97.
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unescorted. Not surprisingly, they recovered their guns, turned and
shot the Canadian attackers in the back.110 George Bell observed
that, at times, support troops moving up to the front had thrown
bombs at prisoners heading in the opposite direction.111
During the Battle of Amiens Corporal (Cpl.) William Kerr, 5th
Battalion claimed an order of battle from 1st Canadian Division
commander Maj.-Gen. Archibald Macdonell included the catchphrase
“prisoners are a nuisance.” This order likely issued by battalion
or company headquarters, was verbally relayed from man to man
and open to misinterpretation. After having taken a trench, Kerr
encountered a German who had been shooting at him. Kerr’s first
instinct—“orders is orders”—was to shoot to kill. However, as the
German emerged from the pillbox holding a flag marked with a red
cross, Kerr hesitated and shot him in the leg instead.112 The disarmed
enemy had “mutated with remarkable speed from dangerous foe to
vulnerable human being.”113
Before the Battle of Amiens, Brig.-Gen. George Tuxford, 3rd
CIB issued an unambiguous directive, with reference to a torpedoed
Canadian hospital ship: the battle cry on 8 August was “Llandovery
Castle,” which “should be the last to ring in the ears of the Hun as
the bayonet was driven home.”114 Cpl. Deward Barnes, 19th Battalion
wrote that upon reaching the Germans’ front line early on August
8, many of the defenders promptly surrendered, shouting mercy and
kamerad. But they were shot in the back as they headed to the
Canadians’ line.115 Nonetheless, there is a paucity of recorded evidence
that prisoner killing was official policy mandated by the Canadian
general staff. In July 1918, Currie allegedly informed 4th Brigade
soldiers on parade at Hauteville that the higher command did not
want any prisoners. Currie’s open-air speech (during heavy showers)

110  
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directed by J. Frank Willis (CBC Audio, 2006), DVD.
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348-50.
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Pan Books, 2001), 250.
114  
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Press, 2001), 31.
115  
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was possibly misinterpreted.116 It is unlikely that Currie requested no
prisoners, as they were a source of intelligence for future operations
such as Amiens. Currie had demanded prisoners as the Canadians
prepared for Vimy Ridge.117
The 46th Battalion mopped up Aulnoy and Mont Houy Wood
before overtaking the 44th north of Aulnoy. Lewis guns, bombs and
fixed bayonets rendered numerous German troops hors de combat.
Every cellar was populated with German infantry and “[t]hose that
offered any show of resistance were killed and the rest sent back as
prisoners.”118 Undoubtedly, a few who capitulated in the heat of battle
never left the cellars; this last-ditch below-ground fighting infuriated
the attackers. Snipers and heavy enemy machine gun fire impeded
patrols from exploiting Marly where citizens had taken refuge in the
cellars. After observing hundreds of enemy dead in Valenciennes,
Lieut. Ronald Holmes, 46th Battalion admitted, “We surely got ours
back for almost a month of hard chasing and dirty fighting.”119
Assailants were in a precarious situation while closing in on
a cornered adversary. When approaching the armed enemy, some
hesitated beyond grenade-throwing range. Major (Maj.) Henry Rose,
58th Battalion suffered a serious bomb wound to his head during an
assault at Amiens. He later discovered that a German prisoner had
been responsible.120 The captor’s dilemma was “to accept a surrender,
with all the personal risks entailed; or to shoot the surrenderer, with
the likelihood that resistance would be stiffened, thus increasing the
risks to one’s own side as a whole.”121 In a courtyard in Marly sixty
Germans capitulated to a small 46th Battalion patrol led by Lieut.
John MacLeod and Sgt. Hugh Cairns. As the prisoners were being
disarmed, a German officer sensed the vulnerability of his opponents
and shot Cairns through his body. Sinking to his knees, Cairns shot
the officer and others who had snatched up their weapons. The
Cook, “The Politics of Surrender,” 655.
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Calgary, 1991), 12.
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46th Canadian Infantry Battalion, Appendix 28, RG9 III-D-2, Volume 4797, File
84, LAC.
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in the Great War 1914-1919 Vol. 1, ed. William Duthie and Charles Foster (Toronto:
The Canadian Bank of Commerce, 1920), 304.
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botched surrender triggered a firefight, which ended with few of the
prisoners surviving their officer’s treacherous act.122
The 47th Battalion, to the left of the 46th, faced serious
opposition beyond their initial objective, Le Poirier Station. There
was relentless fighting and “enemy posts did not surrender until
many had been killed with the bayonet, or shot down.”123 The 47th
had to ford streams including the Vieil Escaut flowing alongside
the eastern bank of the Canal de l’Escaut. Both units reached
the southern outskirts of Valenciennes shortly past 9:00 a.m. The
47th captured an estimated 600 prisoners including a captain who
capitulated with his entire company.124 The war-weary captain was
likely unwilling to carry on the fight, sacrificing more soldiers, and
so led his men into group surrender.125
The 50th Battalion initially supported the 47th, with D Company
attached to them for mopping-up operations—a dangerous task
leaving them exposed from all directions. Street fighting was vicious
and intense as the troops rushed from house to house to outflank
and overwhelm German machine guns firing at close range. They
detained 450 prisoners near Le Poirier Station but many who refused
to surrender were “despatched without mercy.”126 The other three
companies dealt with small enemy parties, which had remained
undetected. Maj. James Parry temporarily in command of 50th
Battalion, confessed with moral indifference, “It was impossible to
avoid taking so many [prisoners] as they surrendered in batches of
from 20 to 50, but some very useful killing was also achieved.”127
Once surrounded, stranded defenders, some possibly injured, gave
themselves up once they realised that resistance was futile. This was
“forced” surrender of soldiers whose morale was intact. Stupefied and
demoralised by the dense artillery concentration, other defenders’

122  
Arthur Currie, “Introduction,” in George Nasmith, Canada’s Sons and Great
Britain in the Great War (Toronto: Winston, 1919), vii-viii; and James McWilliams
and James Steel, The Suicide Battalion (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing,
1990), 201. Cairns’ numerous acts of valour that day earned him the last of sixty-four
Canadian Victoria Crosses awarded in the First World War.
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124  
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4797, File 84, LAC.
125  
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morale had collapsed, and they gave themselves up readily. This was
“unforced” surrender of soldiers who willingly allowed themselves to
be captured.128
Life was cheap in this hostile environment; German snipers,
flamethrowers and machine gun crews fighting to the last instant
were dealt with ruthlessly. A machine gunner fighting a rearguard
action knew he would receive no leniency.129 Near the Quarry west
of Mont Houy, machine gun nests were rushed and guns seized. The
50th Battalion troops gave the crews no quarter.130
On 5 November, Royal Field Artillery signaller Ivor Hanson
was billeted in a factory in Valenciennes where eviscerated German
machine-gunner corpses had been laid out. Hanson surmised that
they had been given no opportunity to surrender.131 Some senior
officers believed “no man in the Great War was ever killed by a
bayonet unless he had his hands up first.”132 In fact, bayonets and
honed entrenching tools inflicted less than one half per cent of British
and German wounds.133 The sight of a menacing cold-steel bayonet
could trigger a swift surrender or retreat. In an undated sample of
212,659 British soldiers admitted to casualty clearing stations only
684 (0.32 per cent) were for bayonet wounds.134 Most soldiers had an
intense resistance to bayoneting an opponent.135 A soldier confided
to a Canadian war correspondent: “I say that I will never let a Hum
live. … But when I find ‘Fritzie’ with no weapons in his hand, begging
for mercy, I just can’t stick him.”136
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The first Canadian platoon to enter Valenciennes from the west, advancing towards the
Canal. [Library and Archives Canada item ID no. 3194823]

The 72nd and 38th Battalions of Brig.-Gen. James MacBrien’s 12th
CIB crossed the Canal de l’Escaut using boats, rafts and footbridges.
Many Germans positioned in machine-gun and rifle posts close to the
canal were taken prisoner by the 72nd Battalion while the balance
made a hasty withdrawal.137 During the Battle of Canal du Nord, a
six-man 72nd Battalion patrol had mopped up a village, taking 150
prisoners. The vastly outnumbered patrol was in a very dangerous
predicament as some Germans escaped and returned to their weapons.
But the Canadians maintained their discipline and escorted some eighty
prisoners back to the 72nd Battalion lines. The rest had bolted.138
At 5:50 a.m. on 2 November the 54th Battalion advanced to Marly
under cover of darkness without artillery support. Close-quarters
137  
Bernard McEvoy and Allan Finlay, History of the 72nd Canadian Infantry
Battalion Seaforth Highlanders of Canada (Vancouver, BC: Cowan & Brookhouse,
1920), 163.
138  
WD, 72nd Battalion, November 1918, Appendix B, RG9 III-D-3, Volume 4943,
File 450, LAC; and McEvoy and Finlay, History of the 72nd Canadian Infantry
Battalion, 146-48.
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combat was fierce as enemy machine gun nests in almost every street
were neutralised. By 7:10 a.m. the village was cleared.139 Near Marly,
the 102nd Battalion passed a gruesome number of enemy dead.140
Advancing at dawn, both the 38th and 72nd Battalions captured
Valenciennes at 7:50 a.m. and proceeded to the eastern outskirts.141
German losses were heavy—a testament to the unprecedented
concentration, weight and precision of the 88,090 artillery shell
deluge. Mechanised killing power, along with some 1,400 10th CIB
adept troops, had inflicted 2,254 enemy casualties in the Mont Houy
attack zone alone; 800 were killed and 1,454 taken prisoner.142 Almost
900 German soldiers were killed and more than 1,700 captured by
4th Canadian Division troops. Long-range enfilading machine gun
barrages plus heavy RAF bombing and strafing augmented the casualty
lists.143 McNaughton observed, “[t]he barrage and bombardment had
left scarcely a square yard of ground untouched. Enemy dead were
everywhere.”144 German defenders lay scattered in sunken roads,
gutters, rifle pits, machine-gun pits, railway embankments, battered
houses and assembly positions; the pervasive stench of cordite lingered
in the air. The cannon-fire avalanche that had drenched the attack
zone with HE and shrapnel—the most intense of any Canadian Corps
barrage—had caused the bulk of the carnage.

conclusion
Were many Germans killed while surrendering at Valenciennes?
Some historians think so.145 Certainly there was the disparity
between 800 German and 104 Canadian fatalities on the 10th CIB
139  
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Infantry Battalion By One of Them (self-published, 1919), 31.
140  
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Canadian Patrol crossing the railway in Valenciennes under heavy machine gun fire,
November, 1918. [Library and Archives Canada item ID no. 3522383]

front during the two-day battle. However, when the artillery’s deadly
effectiveness is taken into account plus the fact that more than 1,400
prisoners were escorted to Canadian POW cages, it is clear that only
a fraction of surrendering soldiers was killed.
Currie did not condemn when he suspected prisoner killing as
retaliatory action: “I am told the ground is simply littered with
German dead. I know that it was not the intention of our fellows
to take many German prisoners as, since they had lived amongst
and talked to the French people here, they have become more bitter
than ever against the Boche.”146 Brig.-Gen. John Ross, 10th CIB,
admitted that German cruelty inflicted upon the French people
fuelled his troops’ yearning to avenge the citizens, stating that “the

146  
Currie’s personal diaries 1914-1919, November 1st, Friday, MG30-E100, Volume
43, File 194, LAC. Nevertheless, there are few primary sources in military archives to
support Currie’s suspicion. See A.M.J. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military
Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 122.
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miserable enemy could expect and certainly received no quarter.”147
Maj.-Gen. Hastings Anderson, First Army General Staff claimed the
Canadians gave little quarter after learning about German atrocities
in the liberated villages.148 Indeed, both Currie and Charles Bean
were apologists for their own countrymen. The military hierarchy’s
repudiation of prisoner mistreatment, in particular prisoner killing,
was an accepted part of life at the front. Killing potential prisoners,
although prohibited and morally problematic, was part of the tragic
human cost for achieving military objectives and consequently victory.
Currie and Ross tolerated their troops’ unauthorised actions that
would likely have led to courts-martial between 1915 and 1917. Not
fulfilling their role in the administration of British military justice
was a crime of tolerance.149 Although they did not encourage unlawful
killings, they understood that soldiers waged war in an atmosphere
of suspicion—already on edge from German treachery and sabotage
such as feigned surrenders and booby-traps. Inhumane treatment of
civilians had inflamed animosity and diminished the soldiers’ sense
of remorse.
Victor Wheeler concisely described the dichotomy of an ordinary
citizen-soldier who became a combatant instructed in military killing:
[M]en who could be driven to momentary ruthlessness or compassionately
succour the defenceless orphan … men who could be motivated to
vengeful carnage yet could, under other circumstances … show mercy
and extend the hand of brotherhood to the enemy.150

A grey area between combat and surrender—between legal and
illegal killing—exits on the battlefield. During the chaos of a face-toface assault, when is surrender to be accepted if some are discarding
their weapons or gesturing capitulation, but others are still showing
fight or are attempting to flee or to remain hidden? Rarely in the
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heat of battle is there a clear break between the two, permitting a
safe surrender.
In the context of the final hundred days, killing confronted
adversaries who were endeavouring to give themselves up was,
according to Nicholson, “to a certain extent understandable.”151 In the
light of their experiences in the autumn of 1918, it was not surprising
that some prisoners were killed by Canadian troops. In fact, Currie
no doubt regarded this unlawful killing as largely inevitable in the
last months of war.152 Even so, slaying defenseless prisoners after they
had surrendered was always deemed criminal. Conversely, killing the
enemy as they surrendered during battle—in circumstances of hot
blood—caused less condemnation.153
Military indiscipline (stemming from war weariness and failures
in leadership), fear, innate brutality, military expediency, ambiguous
orders as well as German acts of treachery resulted in killing the
surrendering enemy. Another powerful motive for prisoner killing on
the Western Front was revenge. The systemic cruelty perpetrated
against vulnerable civilians was the final catalyst that, in some
Canadian soldiers’ minds, justified killing prisoners at the point of
capture; thereby quenching their thirst for revenge.

appendix: the battle of valenciennes casualties
Close cooperation between infantry and artillery was essential
in warfare and gun power was fully exploited to preserve attacking
troops. Commencing with Vimy Ridge, all major Canadian offensives
were coordinated around the artillery fire plan.154 McNaughton was
convinced that the Battle of Valenciennes epitomised Currie’s policy
to “pay the price of victory, so far as possible, in shells and not in the
lives of men.”155 Each 10th CIB attacking soldier was supported by
1.5 tons of shells. The 144 18-pounders’ shrapnel barrage produced a

151  
G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Ottawa:
Queen’s Printer, 1964), 475.
152  
Chase, “Unwilling to Continue, Ordered to Advance,” 100.
153  
Heather Jones, “The Enemy Disarmed: Prisoners of War and the Violence of
Wartime: Britain, France and Germany, 1914-1920” (PhD Dissertation, University
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Table 1. 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade Casualties at Valenciennes156
Battalion

Soldiers in Action

Casualties 1-2 November

44th

200

89

46th

410

126

47th

398

135

50th

400 (est.)

127

Total

1,408

477

density of one gun for every 17 yards of 10th CIB front. Nevertheless,
there was a 34 per cent casualty rate in the 10th CIB. (See Table 1)
The number of 10th CIB casualties has been documented as high
as 501.157 The difference may be that casualty lists, compiled at the
base, included daily casualty wires from the units, casualties picked
up by other units and by Field Ambulances.
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